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Not long ago, at the request of the nursing staff at a local Catholic hospital ,
I was consulted as a bioethicist regarding the case of an 86-year-old
woman who had metastatic colon cancer and Alzheimer's disease. The
non-competent patient was in the last stages of terminal cancer and her
attending physician, with the consent of her surrogate decision-maker,
decided that all aggressive medical treatment should be tenninated and
palliative care should be initiated. The only request by the family was that
their mother be free of pain. Unsure of the extent of the patient's pain due
to the Alzheimer's disease the physician started a morphine drip. The
purpose of the morphine was to manage the patient's pain, but everyone
knew that the continuous injection of morphine into the patient's vein
would gradually kill the patient by depressing her respiration. The nursing
staff was very uncomfortable with this because they questioned whether
the physician and family were directly trying to shorten the patient's life.
The patient did not appear to be in serious pain and without the morphine
she would probably live for days or even weeks. Two ethical questions
arose: first, was the morphine necessary in this case; and second, was the
morphine being used for pain management or was it being used as a form
of assisted suicide?
It is estimated that 30 to 40 million Americans depend on morphine,
despite its side effects, to relieve severe pain. The use of morphine as a pain
reliever, even at high doses, has been accepted by the Roman Catholic
Church for centuries under the principle of double effect. The Church
argues that there is a moral difference between the effects of actions which
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are intended versus those which are foreseen but unintended. "Medicines
capable of alleviating or suppressing pain may be given to a dying patient,
even if this therapy may indirectly shorten the person's life so long as the
intent is not to hasten death." I Even though a foreseen but unintended side
effect of morphine may be respiratory depression and thus a shortened life
span, morphine may be prescribed if the intention is to directly alleviate
pain. The problem is that there are critics who believe th at the use of
morphine for terminal patients is "society's wink to euthanasia."2 As long
as the "stated" intention is to relieve pain, the use of morphine is legal and
ethical. Critics contend that some physicians have used and continue to use
morphine as a form of active euthanasia and justify it ethically under the
principle of double effect. This has made many inside and outside the
medical profession suspicious of morphine 's use when administered to
terminal patients.
On January 1, 1998 Abbott Laboratories in Chicago announced the
development of a new painkiller called ABT-594. According to Michael
Williams, a scientist and vice-president at Abbott, "ABT-594 appears to be
many times more powerful than morphine, but lacks the serious sideeffects ... Tests with laboratory animals showed that ABT-594 did not
diminish respiration nor cause constipation. Laboratory animals showed no
sign of addiction to ABT-594 and the drug appeared to be effective no
matter how long it was used."3 At this writing, safety trials with humans are
underway in Europe and similar trials will hopefully be undertaken in the
United States. The ethical question which arises is: if ABT-594 does prove
effective and does not have the side effects of morphine, should the
Catholic Church reexamine its position on morphine as a form of pain
management considering the objections critics have raised concerning the
possible misuse of morphine as a form of active euthanasia?
The purpose of thi s article is threefold: first, to examine the function
of the principle of double effect; second, to compare and contrast morphine
and ABT-594 as pain medications; third, to give an ethical analysis of the
current controversy on the use of morphine and to determine if it is morally
justifiable under the principle of double effect if ABT-594 is approved as a
painkiller for humans?

The Function of the Principle of Double effect
The principle of double effect is a fundamental principle in Roman
Catholic moral theology, which is complex in its application to practical
cases. As the name implies, it refers to one action that produces two
effects. One effect is intended and is morally good while the other is
unintended and is morally evil. It is not an inflexible rule or mathematical
formula, but rather an efficient guide to prudent moral judgment in solving
110
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difficult moral dilemmas. 4 Historically, many ethicists believe that the
premises for the principle can be found in the writings of Thomas Aquinas.
However, others contend that the principle may have been understood
implicitly many centuries before it was actually formulated. Moralist
Joseph Mangan contends that the principle was used implicitly to justify
moral actions in the Old Testament. 5 Explicitly, Mangan argues that
Thomas Aquinas is the first to enunciate this principle in his famous
explanation of the lawfulldlling of another in self-defense in the Summa
The%gica, II-II, q. 64, a.7c. Ethicists Tom Beauchamp and James
Childress agree with Mangan on this point. 6 Josef Ghoos, however,
believes that an argument can be made otherwise. "Ghoos showed that the
moral solutions from the thirteenth through the sixteenth century were of
isolated concrete cases. In the sixteenth century, Bartolomeo Median (1528
- 1580) and Gabriel Vazquez (1551 - 1604) began to name the common
factors among the paradigm cases. Finally, John of St. Thomas (1589 1644) articulated the factors into the conditions of the principle as such."7
However, the four conditions of the principle were not finally formulated
until the mid-nineteenth century by Jean Pierre Gury.8The principle of
double effect specified four conditions which must be fulfilled for an
action with both a good and a bad effect to be morally justified.
1. The action, considered by itself and independently of its effects,
must not be morally evil. The object of the action must be good or
indifferent.
2. The evil effect must not be the means of producing the good effect.
3. The evil effect is sincerely not intended, but merely tolerated.
4. There must be a proportionate reason for performing the action, in
spite of its evil consequence. 9

It should be noted that a number of moral theologians known as
propOJ1ionaiists have argued that the first three conditions of the principle
of double effect are incidental to the principle, and that in reality it is
reducible to the fourth condition of proportionate reason. While this is a
legitimate argument, it is not the purpose of this article to reopen the
controversy on the validity of the first three conditions. This article will
remain within the framework of the four conditions of the principle of
double effect, as it exists in fundamental moral theology, and apply these
conditions to the use of morphine as an ethical painldller. 10
The use of narcotics to control pain was sanctioned by Pope Pius XII
under the principle of double effect. In answer to a group of doctors who
posed the question : "Is the suppression of pain and consciousness by the
use of narcotics permitted by religion and morality to the doctor and the
patient (even at the approach of death and if one foresees that the use of
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narcotics will shorten life)?" The Pope stated: "If no other means exist, and
if, in the given circumstances, this does not prevent the carrying out of
other religious and moral duties: Yes."11 According to the principle of
double effect "in this case, of course, death is in no way intended or sought,
even if the risk of it is reasonably taken; the intention is simply to relieve
pain effectively, using for this purpose painkillers available to medicine."12
The Church believes that suffering is part of the human condition and has a
special place in God's plan of salvation. However, the Church also believes
that effective management of pain and suffering is necessary so that the
person can die comfortably and with dignity and respect.
The use of morphine to manage pain effectively is ethically justified
because it meets the four conditions of the principle of double effect. The
first condition allows for the injection of morphine because the action in
and of itself is good, in that it effectively alleviates or manages the pain of
the patient. While morphine may endanger the patient's life by suppressing
respiration, the injection will not directly terminate the patient's life. The
second condition allows for the injection of morphine because the good
effect is not caused by means of the evil effect. The patient's pain is
alleviated by the morphine, not by the patient's death. The good effect and
the evil effect happen simultaneously. The third condition allows for the
injection of morphine because even though there is the possibility that the
morphine may harm the patient, the intention of the physician is to
alleviate or manage the patient's pain. Finally, there is a proportionate
reason for allowing for the morphine because the patient's pain is
intolerable and there is no hope for a cure. 13 Even though morphine is
morally justified by the principle of double effect, considering the serious
side effects and the possibility of abuse, would it still be morally justified if
there were a viable alternative?

Morphine vs. ABT-594
Morphine is an opium alkaloid and is the prototype of the opioid
analgesics. In the non-tolerant patient with severe pain, it provides
analgesia at a dose of about 10 mg 1M that does not result in severe
alterations in consciousness. Morphine affects both the initial perception of
pain and the emotional response to it. Total relief from pain is not always
possible to achieve, but morphine can reduce the level of distress and
suffering. Traditionally, oral morphine has been considered to be
ineffective. It is transformed rapidly in the liver and excreted in the urine.
However, with upward titration of the dose, oral morphine can be very
effective in managing chronic pain. A slow-release tablet that dispenses
morphine over 8 to 12 hours and a concentrated oral solution have been
developed in attempts to make oral morphine more acceptable. Morphine
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sulfate is the most commonly used water-soluble salt. Very low doses of
intraspinal morphine (e.g., 5 to 10 mg epidurally or 0.5 to 1 mg
intrathecally) can provide long-lasting (up to 24 hour) pain relief
postoperatively and in selected nontolerant cancer patients. To date,
morphine is the drug most commonly used to manage pain for cancer
patients. 14
Adverse effects of morphine are dose-related. These adverse effects
include respiratory depression, decreased cough reflex, nausea, vomiting,
constipation, itch, sedation, and confusion. Morphine can also produce
miosis and can cause contraction of peripheral smooth muscle, the most
important effect of which is decreased propulsive movements in the
gastrointestinal tract, causing constipation. Morphine causes the venules
(capacitance vessels) to dilate, and hypotension may occur in hypovolemic
patients or those who suddenly assume the upright position. The
development of tolerance to morphine varies from one physiologic system
to another (e.g., tolerance develops slowly to the constipating effect,
whereas respiratory depression or nausea typically wanes soon after
treatment begins). During chronic therapy, an increase in dosage may
become necessary to achieve the same degree of pain relief, since the
duration of action shortens and the peak analgesic effect decreases. I S
One major criticism of using morphine as a painkiller is that
physicians often do not adequately explain to patients or their appropriate
surrogate decision-makers how morphine works and what are its side
effects. This is because many physicians are not adequately trained in the
art of pain management. Instead of referring the terminal patient to a
palliative care team which has expertise in pain management, the physician
writes an order for morphine and the family is left to watch their loved one
die. Questions about the amount of morphine prescribed, who should
determine if the dosage should be increased, and what side effects may be
expected, are left unanswered. Families are often unprepared for what they
will experience. Instead of becoming sedated, many patients experience
the reaction agitation. Families find themselves struggling just to keep the
patient in bed. Often, physicians will write an order to increase the
morphine dosage at the direction of the surrogate, without considering the
fact that the surrogate may not be competent to make such decisions.
Christine Campi, executive director of Medical Mission International,
explains the sense of frustration and lack of guidelines many family
members feel when confronted with the use of morphine for their loved
one. In an editorial that appeared in The New York Times , Campi explains
how her husband 's oncologist had written an order that her husband, who
was dying of terminal bone cancer with metastasis to the brain, could be
given up to 30 milligrams of morphine at her direction. She was the
surrogate decision maker. "At doses of 4 to 6 milligrams, my husband
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tossed and turned and his breathing was ragged. I asked for 10 milligrams
and he began to choke. I asked the nurse to push the morphine pump to 30
milligrams and my husband died, no longer struggling, within two hours.
Did I kill him? I don't know. Did I push the morphine pump to warp speed
to relieve his suffering or mine?: I don 't knoW." 16 In many instances
patients and families are ill-prepared emotionally and clinically to make
these decisions concerning the use of morphine. The result is that either the
patient's pain is not managed adequately, or the families are left with
feelings of guilt that they may have caused the death of the patient. Family
members may carry these feelings of guilt and frustration with them for a
lifetime. Ethically, similar situations have led many health care
professionals and non-health care professionals to question the use of
morphine as an effective way to manage pain in terminal patients.
News that Abbott Laboratories had developed a new pain medication
that has the benefits of morphine, but none of its side effects, was hailed as
a possible major breakthrough in pain management. Apparently ABT-594
acts not through opioid receptors but through a receptor for the
neurotransmitter acetylcholine and blocks both acute and chronic pain in
rats. ABT-594 was developed from a compound called epibatidine, which
was extracted from the skin of an Ecuadorian from called Epipedobates
tricolor, at the National Institutes of Health (NIH). In 1976, John Daly, of
the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases, an
NIH agency, found epibatidine to be 200 times more potent than morphine
at blocking pain in animals. Daly's research came to an abrupt halt,
however, when the lab-grown frogs failed to produce the compound and he
could no longer collect the Epipedobates tricolor because they were placed
on the endangered species list. The sample was stored in a freezer for
future research. A decade later, Thomas Spande and Martin Garraffo at the
NIH, using a nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy, determined the
chemical structure of epidatidine and found that it resembled nicotine.
They learned that it activates the nicotinic acetylcholine receptor. The
problem was that while epibatidine is a potent analgesic, it is far too toxic
for human use. It was found to cause seizures and even death in lab
animals. The results of their findings and a diagram of the chemical
structure of epibatidine was published in the journal Science. Researchers
at Abbot Laboratories realized that epibatidine resembled a group of drugs
aimed at the nicotinic receptor that the company was studying in its search
for a treatment for Alzheimer's disease. Out of 500 variants they produced
and then screened in animals, researchers decided to focus on ABT-594
because it seemed to work against different types of pain and produced few
side effects. It also lacked the elements that made the frog compound
toxic. 17
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In tests conducted by the Abbott team, "ABT-594, nicotine, and
morphine were compared in animal models of acute therm al (rat hot box)
and persistent chemical (formalin test) pain. In the hot box assay, morphine
and nicotine are effective in attenu ating the response to pain. ABT-594
was, however, 30 to 70 times more potent in eliciting a dose-dependent
antinociceptive effect, with an efficacy similar to that seen with
morphine."' 8 Researchers also found that in addition to not causing
constipation, ABT-594 depresses the respiratory system far less than
morphine and makes animals more alert instead of sedating them. In at
least one test, animals showed no sign of addiction and ABT-594 appeared
to be effective no matter how long it was used. Rats that were taken off
ABT-594 after being treated with a high dose for ten days did not suffer the
withdrawal sy mptom of appetite suppression seen after treating with other
opioids." '9 These results appear to be very promising, but until human
testing is completed both in Europe and in the United States those suffering
from severe pain will have to continue to rely on morphine.20

Ethical Analysis
In the event that ABT-594 does prove to be an effective painkiller in
humans with minimal side effects, a reexamination of the ethical
justification for the use of morphine as a pain reliever for terminal patients,
by the principle of doubl e effect, will be necessary. I would argue that
morphine would not be ethically justifiable because the fourth condition of
the principle of double effect would be violated. The fourth condition
states that there must be proportionate reason for performing an action, in
spite of its evil consequence. Since morphine can bring on respiratory
depression and an earlier death, and ABT-594 does not depress respiration,
there is not a proportionate reason for allowing the use of morphine as a
pain reliever for terminal patients.
Proportionate reason refers to both a specific value and its relations
to all the elements (i ncluding premoral evils) in the action. 2 1 The Catholic
Church allows for the use of morphine today because the value of relieving
pain outweighs the premoral evil of the possibility of death from
respiratory depression. The question that arises, should ABT-594 prove to
be effective, is whether a proportionate reason exists for the use of
morphine? To determine this one must examine the criteria for
proportionate reason. Ethicist Richard McCormick, SJ., proposes three
criteria for determining if a proper relation exists between a specific value
and the other elements of an act:
1) The means used will not cause more harm than necessary
to achieve the value.
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2) No less harmful way exists at present to protect the
value.
3) The means used to achieve the value will not undermine

it. 22
According to McCormick's criteria, if ABT-594 becomes a viable
painkiller for terminal patients, the use of morphine would be unethical by
all three criteria. First, since morphine does depress respiration and can
cause an early death, morphine would cause more harm than necessary.
Second, if ABT-594 proves to be effective, then a less harmful way exists
to relieve pain for the terminal patient and it will not hasten death. Third,
using morphine will undermine the value of human life because it can
depress respiration and hasten death. If proven effective, ABT-594 will
relieve the patient's pain with no life-threatening side effects. Therefore, in
the event that ABT-594 proves effective, the use of morphine as a pain
reliever for terminal patients should no longer be morally justified by the
principle of double effect.

Conclusion
In our present culture, the debate concerning death and dying is
becoming fixated on the patient's right to die with dignity and respect.
Patients believe they have the right to determine when and how they should
die, and it is the physician's role to assist them. Death with dignity has
become synonymous with physician-assisted suicide. As a result, health
care professionals are becoming suspicious of one another when certain
patients die sooner rather than later. Part of this suspicion lately has
focused on the use of morphine as the cause of death. Death by sedation
can no longer be ignored. I believe that morphine has been used both as a
form of active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide for years under
the ethical guise of the principle of double effect. The morphine drip is
used at the discretion of physicians and its use is often arbitrary and
inequitable. Oftentimes the decision to use morphine is not made for the
good of the patient but for the convenience of the family, the physician and
the hospital. In addition, since surrogate decision-makers are often not
emotionally and clinically competent to decide whether morphine should
be administered and how much should be administered, when death
comes, so too, come the agonizing questions. Did I help to kill my father?
Was my intention to ease my mother's pain or to ease my own suffering?
Presently, morphine is the most effective drug we have to ease
intolerable pain for most terminal cancer patients. If the physician's
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intention in using morphine is to manage a patient's pain and the physician
is aware of the foreseen but unintended consequence of respiratory
depression and a possible early death, then morphine can continue to be
justified by the principle of double effect. However, if ABT-594 does prove
to be an effective painkiller for terminal patients and it does not have the
side effects of morphine, then morphine can no longer be justified under
the principle of double effect because it violates proportionate reason.
Until the clinical trials with humans prove successful, health care
professionals should continue to monitor the use of morphine with
terminal patients. The nurses who initiated the ethics consultation on the 8year-old woman with metastatic colon cancer had legitimate questions
concerning the physician's use of morphine. As a result, I called a meeting
of the physician, the family, and the nursing staff, so that each had an
opportunity to voice his or her concerns. At the end of the hour-long
meeting all parties were in agreement that the use of morphine was
justifiable and the best course of pain management for this patient. It was a
good learning experience for all parties concerned and it emphasized the
importance of communication and team work. As medicine becomes more
sophisticated and technological, there is a need for physicians, nurses and
patients to be in dialogue with one another. Questions need to be asked,
alternatives should be suggested, and the hermeneutic of suspicion ought to
be employed in order to ensure that all patients are treated with dignity and
respect. Only then will suspicion be replaced with trust.
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